Abstract. We prove the rst general and non-trivial lower bound for the number of times a 1-outof-n Oblivious Transfer of strings of length`should be invoked so as to obtain, by an informationtheoretically secure reduction, a 1-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer of strings of length L. Our bound is tight in many signi cant cases. We also prove the rst non-trivial lower bound for the number of random bits needed to implement such a reduction whenever the receiver sends no messages to the sender. This bound is also tight in many signi cant cases.
Introduction
The Oblivious Transfer. The Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a fundamental primitive in secure protocol design, which has been de ned in many di erent ways and contexts (e.g. 17 The OT is a protocol typically involving two players, the sender and the receiver, and several parameters. In the most used form, the ? N 1 -OT L 2 , the sender has N binary secrets of length L, and the receiver gets exactly one of these strings, the one he chooses, but no information about any other secret (even if he cheats), while the sender (even if she cheats) gets no information about the secret learned by the receiver.
Also important is the notion of a weak Oblivious Transfer, a relaxation of the traditional OT. The only di erence in a weak ? N 1 -OT L 2 is that a cheating receiver is allowed to obtain partial information about several secrets, but at most L bits of information overall.
Reductions between different OTs. Protocol reductions facilitate protocol design because they enable one to take advantage of implementing cryptographically only a few, carefully chosen, primitives. Information-theoretic reductions are even more attractive, because they guarantee that the security of a complex construction automatically coincides with that of the chosen primitive, once the latter is implemented cryptographically. But to be really useful, reductions must be e cient. In particular, because even the best cryptographic implementation of a chosen primitive may be expensive to run, it is crucial that reductions call such primitives as few times as possible.
Because of the importance of OT, numerous reductions from \more complex" to \simpler" OT appear in the literature (e.g. ? n 1 -OT2, where N n and L `, both in the weak and in the strong case. Typically, these reductions are information-theoretically secure if the simpler OT is assumed to be so secure. An important class of OT reductions are the ones in which the receiver sends no messages to the sender. Such reductions are called natural, both because all known OT reductions are of this type (e.g. 5], 6], 3]), and because they immediately imply that the sender gets no information about the receiver's index.
So far, researchers have been focusing on improving the upper bounds of these reductions, that is, the number of times one calls Our results. In this paper we provide the rst general lower bounds for such information-theoretic OT reductions, and prove that these bounds are tight in signi cant cases. Namely, we prove that
In any information-theoretically secure reduction of (even weak!) We note that, in a natural reduction, the amount of randomness used by the sender necessarily coincides with the total amount of randomness needed by both parties.
We point out the interesting special case when n = 2 and`= 1, i. or \learn no information other than ...". We point out, however, that information theory is much more useful than merely de ning the problem. Indeed, we shall demonstrate that its powerful machinery is essential in solving our problem, for example, in proving our L N?1 n?1 lower bound on the number of invocations. Only the trivial bound of L appears to be provable without information theory. But getting the additional N?1 n?1 factor in the lower bound (which is essential when L =`) requires explicit or implicit use of information theory.
We believe and hope that information theory will prove useful for other types of lower bounds in protocol problems.
Preliminaries
2.1 Information Theory Background Let X; Y; Z by random variables over domains X; Y; Z. Let us denote by P X (x), P XjZ (xjz), P X;Y (x; y) the probability distribution of X, conditional probability distribution of X given Z, and joint distribution of X and Y respectively.
De nition 1.
The entropy H(X) = ? P x P X (x) log 2 P X (x). The entropy of a random variable X tells how many truly random bits one can extract from X, i.e. how much \uncertainty" is in X. The following easily veri ed lemma summarizes some of the properties we will need. Lemma 1. Let us denote by a n-sender a probabilistic ITM having n special registers, and by a n-receiver is probabilistic ITM having a single special register. Let A be a n-sender and B a n-receiver. We say that (A; B) is a protocol with ideal ? n 1 -OT2 if, letting a be a private input for A and b be a private input for B, the computation of (A; B) proceeds as that of pair of ITMs, except that it consists of three (rather than the usual two) types of rounds: sender-rounds, receiver-rounds and OT-rounds, where by convention the rst round always is a sender-round and the last is a receiver-round.
In a sender-round, only A is active, and it sends a message to B (that will become an input to B at the start of the next receiver-round). In a receiver-round, only B is active and, except for the last round, it sends a message to A (this message will become an input to A at the start of the next sender-round).
In an OT round, (1) A places for each j 2 1; n] an`-bit string j in its jth special register, and (2) B places an integer i 2 1; n] in its special register, and (3) i will become a distinguished input to B at the start of the next receiver-round. A will obtain no information about i. At the end of any execution of (A; B), B computes a distinguished string called B's output.
Messages and Views. Let (A; B) be a protocol with ideal ? n 1 -OT2. Then, in an execution of (A; B), we refer to the messages that A sends in a sender-round as A's ordinary messages, and to the strings that A writes in its special registers in an OT-round as A's potential OT messages. For each OT-round, only one of the n potential messages will be received by B, and we shall refer to all such received messages as B's actual OT messages. Recalling that both A and B are probabilistic, in a random execution of (A; B) where the private input of A is a and the private input of B is b, let us denote by VIEW A A(a); B(b)] the random variable consisting of (1) a, (2) A's coin tosses, and (3) 
This property says that we allow a malicious receiver B 0 to obtain partial information about possibly several strings, provided he learns no more than L bits of information overall. To emphasize the di erence, , we get that Alice(w; R A ) will determine for sure that Bob's index is not i. Thus, when Bob's index is i 0 , with non-zero probability over Bob's random string, Alice(w; R A ) would obtain information about Bob's index (that it is not i), contradicting the receiver privacy condition. 1 Since we are proving a lower bound, it clearly applies to (strong) ? N To derive our lower bound for , we de ne the following two notions: that of a special execution of P and that of a pseudo-execution of P.
Special execution. A special execution of P is an execution of P in which Alice's input is a sequence of N randomly selected strings of length L, Alice's tape consists of randomly and independently selected bits, Bob's index is 1, and Bob's tape is the all-zero string, 0. In other words, we x the behavior of Bob by xing his index and the random string. With respect to a special execution of P, de The claim follows.
By combining Local Claims 1 and 2, we have NL L + `(n ? 1) , from which the desired lower bound for immediately follows.
Lower Bound on the Number of Random Bits
Let us now prove the lower bound on the number of random bits needed by the sender in a natural reduction. ? n 1 -OT2. As before, let W be the random input of Alice, R be her random tape, M s be her ordinary messages sent to Bob and V be her \potential" messages. We notice that since the reduction is natural, the distribution of V and M s does not depend on Bob's index and his random string. Let V j , j = 1 : : : n, be an -tuple consisting of string number j taken from each of the invocations of ? n 1 -OT2.
We see that V is the disjoint union of V 1 ; : : : ; V n .
As before, we proceed by expanding the mutual information between W and (V; M s ) in two di erent 
Here we used the fact that W is determined from V and M s . Indeed, since V and M s do not depend on Bob's input or random string, Alice should make sure that honest Bob can retrieve any W i with probability 1 (if his input is i).
On the other hand, it is a possible behavior for a (malicious) Bob to read string number j in all the OT-rounds, i.e. to obtain V j . By the weak sender privacy condition, I((V j ; M s ); W) L, and, therefore, for any j 2 1; n] we have (using Lemma 1, equations 5 and 6) I
Combining this with Equation (5), we get
Since V is a disjoint union of V j 's, we get from the above equation (for j = n) and Lemma 1 (equations completeness purposes, we also include the proof that this protocol works. Though a similar proof could be derived from 5], the one included here is more direct because our de nition of a reduction is slightly simpler. 3 Note that the same protocol also proves that our lower bounds are tight for reduction of (strong) Moreover, for L =`, the reduction actually is a reduction of (strong) Let W = W 1 ; : : : ; W N be chosen at random as well as Alice's random string R = X 1 ; : : : ; X ?1 . Let V be the random variable containing all ( n) values of the ? n 1 -OT2 boxes. We can assume w.l.o.g. that 3 You might notice, we embed the security of ? n in each of the OT boxes, Bob indeed read one entire`-bit string that he chose (he can not learn more and it \does not hurt" to learn as much as possible). Thus, de ne V r to be the -tuple of`-bit strings that Bob read, i.e. everything that Bob learned from the protocol. Let H(V nV r j V r ) =`(N ? 1) (8) Proof: We show that all ( n)`-bit strings of V are totally independent when W and R are randomly chosen. Let us view each such string in V as an (N + ? 1)-dimensional vector over Z 2 by taking the characteristic vector of the equation de ning this string. Since all W i and X j are chosen randomly, our strings are independent i the corresponding vectors are linearly independent. Assume that some linear combination of vectors in V is zero. This combination cannot include a vector depending on some W i as there is only one such vector in V . And the remaining vectors X 1 ; X 1 X 2 ; : : : ; X ?2 X ?1 are clearly linearly independent. And since our disjoint split of V into V r and V nV r does not depend on V nV r , we get that V nV r is independent of V r , so by Lemma 1 (equation 5), H(V nV r j V r ) = jV nV r j =`(n ?1) = (N ? 1). Local Claim 3: V nV r is determined from W and V r , i.e.
H(V nV r j (V r ; W)) = 0 privacy. We clearly loose the strong property (P3) as Bob can learn up to L=`di erent blocks of length from di erent strings. However, weak property (P3 0 ) still holds as the L=`groups of boxes are totally independent, and from each of them Bob can learn at most`bits about W, i.e. a total of at most L = L bits.
